# Security & Audits

## Audits & Testing

Unstable Protocol shares its **core CDP architecture** with Lybra V2, a battle-tested system that has undergone multiple audits by [Consensys](https://diligence.consensys.io/audits/2023/08/lybra-finance/), [Halborn](https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Solidity%20Smart%20Contract%20Audits/Lybra_Finance_V2_Smart_Contract_Security_Assessment_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf), and [Code4rena](https://code4rena.com/reports/2023-06-lybra).&#x20;

Unstable Protocol was audited **by** [**KALOS Security**](https://kalos.xyz) in **May 2024**. The audit report can be found [here](https://www.unstable.money/kalos_audit052024.pdf).

Additionally, Unstable Protocol engaged [**Alberto Cuesta Cañada**](https://x.com/alcueca)—co-author of ERC4626 (Tokenized Vaults), ERC3156 (Flash Loans), and ERC7266 (Oracles); former CTO of Yield Protocol; current judge for Code4rena, Cantina and engineer at Optimism —as a consultant. Alberto contributed to both protocol mechanics and the design of our testing framewor&#x6B;**,** which applies the **Branching Tree Technique (BTT)** to exhaustively map edge cases and protocol invariants.

## Safety & Risk Management

### Protocol Safety Features

#### Access Control

* Multi-tier access control scheme separates critical functions (Owner) from operational functions (Admin), enabling rapid emergency responses while protecting high-impact changes
* Vault-level pause switches for mint, burn, and redemption

#### Vault & Oracle Safety

* Supply caps per vault to limit risk exposure
* Multiple oracle types with ability to update if compromised
* Toggle between redemption rate and market pricing modes
* Depeg thresholds to auto-pause minting during market instability

### Collateral Onboarding Framework

* Collateral types are classified as **stable-denominated**, **ETH-denominated**, and **volatile/other-denominated wrappers**
* **Stable-denominated wrappers** (e.g. scUSD, wstkscUSD): high initial LTVs (up to 97%) with strict peg stability, liquidity, and oracle integrity requirements
* **ETH-denominated wrappers** (e.g. scETH): moderate LTVs (e.g. 80%) with risk buffers for slashing, withdrawal delays, and price tracking deviations
* **Volatile/other-denominated wrappers** (e.g. stS): conservative LTVs (e.g. 75%) due to higher volatility, complex redemption mechanics, and oracle fragility
* All assets must meet minimum on-chain liquidity thresholds
* Initial debt ceilings are capped per asset; borrowing is limited until stability and liquidity are proven over time
* Timelock delay is enforced for onboarding and parameter changes&#x20;
* Parameters are scaled gradually with protocol adoption; risk settings tighten as TVL grows to preserve solvency


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